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Abstract  
Increasing reliance on the electronic mail         
(e-mail) has attracted spammers to send more and more 
spam e-mails in order to maximizing their financial 
gains. These unwanted e-mails are not only clogging the 
Internet traffic but are also causing storage problems at 
the receiving servers.  Besides these, spam e-mails also 
serve as a vehicle to a variety of online crimes and 
abuses. Although several anti-spam procedures are 
currently employed to distinguish spam e-mails from the 
legitimate e-mails yet spammers and phishes obfuscate 
their e-mail content to circumvent anti-spam procedures. 
Efficiency of anti-spam procedures to combat spam entry 
into the system greatly depend on their level of operation 
and a clear insight of various possible modes of 
spamming. In this paper we investigate directed graph 
model of Internet e-mail infrastructure and spamming 
modes used by spammers to inject spam into the system. 
The paper outlines the routes, system components, 
devices and protocols exploited by each spamming mode. 
Keywords 
Spam, Anti-spam, Spam filter, Mail Server, MUA, 
MTA. 
1. Introduction 
E-mail has emerged as a free, valuable and crucial 
worldwide business tool but its availability is put at risk 
[10]  by the kinds of unsolicited content that are fed into 
it. Growing volumes of Spam, malware and virus 
infections received via e-mail are the major concerns for 
both e-mail users and its service providers [1]. Spam e-
mails are making adverse effects on the Internet 
bandwidth as it constitutes most of the e-mail traffic. 
Further, the volume of Spam received by users is creating 
storage problems on email servers resulting in lower 
performance levels and as such demand for larger 
memory mailboxes is rapidly increasing. Spam e-mails 
are serving as a carrier for various other online crimes 
and abuses that include: carrying out of phishing attacks, 
delivering viruses and worms, financial loss or even 
identity theft. Several technological and legal anti-spam 
measures have been proposed [2] but mainly filtering and 
blocking approaches are currently employed as they do 
not need any infrastructural change in the e-mail system.  
Spam is injected at various places into the e-mail system 
by spammers using a variety of techniques and tools that 
include spoofing, botnets, open proxies, mail relays, 
untraceable Internet connections, and bulk mail tools 
called mailers. In order to devise an effective anti spam 
procedure it is thus essential to have a clear insight of 
Internet e-mail infrastructure and the spamming modes 
used by the spammers for spamming. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
section 2 we present the basic e-mail communication 
model followed by Directed Graph model in section 3. In 
sections 4 and 5 we respectively make the mail path 
analysis and mail categorization. In section 6 we deduce 
the spamming modes, outline the protocol groups 
exploited and list places where anti-spam measures can 
be applied for a particular spamming mode. Finally we 
conclude in section 7. 
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2. E-mail Communication Model 
A simple communication model as shown in figure 1 
consists of four components along the path of an e-mail 
message [3]. They are sender client, sending server, 
receiving server and receiving client all on the Internet. 
E-mail clients are client computers running Outlook 
Express, Office Outlook, Eudora or other similar mail 
client application while e-mail servers are server 
computers running server software e.g. Exchange server 
or Sendmail Server. In Web based e-mail services such 
as in case of mail.yahoo.com and gmail.google.com 
clients and servers are combined and are integrated 
behind a web server. The purpose of devices used is 
mentioned hereunder: 
Sender’s Client: The sender composes an e-mail 
message, generally using a mail client program on local 
machine. The mail once, composed is not immediately 
sent out over the Internet; it is held in a buffer area called 
a spool. This allows the user to be "unattached" for the 
entire time so that a number of outgoing messages can be 
created. When the user is done, all of the messages can 
be sent at once.  
Sender's SMTP Server: When the user's mail is 
ready to be sent, it connects to the internetwork. The 
messages are then communicated to the user's designated 
SMTP server. The mail is sent from the Senders client 
machine to the senders SMTP server using SMTP. It is 
also possible for the sender to work directly with senders 
SMTP server; in this case sending is simplified. 
Recipient’s SMTP Server:  The sender’s SMTP 
server sends the mail using SMTP to the recipient’s 
SMTP server over the internetwork. There, the e-mail is 
placed in the recipient’s incoming mailbox (or inbox). 
This is comparable to the outgoing spool that exists on 
sender’s client machine. It allows the recipient to 
accumulate e-mail from many sources over a period of 
time and retrieve them as per their convenience.  
Recipient’s Client: In certain case the recipient may 
access its mailbox directly on the recipients SMTP 
server. More often, however, a mail access and retrieval 
protocol, such as Post Office Protocol (POP3) or Internet 
Message Access Protocol (IMAP), is used to read the 
mail from the SMTP server and display it on the 
recipient’s local machine using an e-mail client program, 
similar to the one used to compose the message at the 
senders client. 
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Figure 1: E‐mail Communication Model [3] 
Each device consists of a number of different elements, which communicate as indicated by the dark and thin arrows. 
The large arrows show a typical email transaction  
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-47
N. A. Shah & M. Tariq Banday 
System Analysis of SPAM  
 
Page 3 of 8 
Proceedings of 4th J&K Science Congress 12th to 14th Nov, 2008, University of Kashmir 
Internet pioneer Jon Postel formalized the technical 
specifications for transferring e-mail with the Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [4, 9] which has 
undergone several revisions and has been adapted as a 
Request For Comments (RFC) by IETF (Internet 
Engineering Task Force) [5] which is responsible for 
defining and maintaining e-mail standards. SMTP is an 
application layer protocol for TCP/IP based Internet 
infrastructure which sets conversational and grammatical 
rules for exchanging e-mail between computers. The 
SMTP is simple in content and requirements. It 
minimizes information that must be included in the 
exchange and leaves functions such as authentication to 
other protocols and applications. This simple architecture 
makes SMTP easy to implement and use, but the 
spammers have misused these advantages and have 
exploited its underlying trust to target recipients with 
spam, hide their own identities, and conceal their tracks 
[11]. The IETF offers protocols that add security features 
to SMTP, but these have not been widely adopted. The 
backwards-compatibility challenge and the need for 
widespread, if not universal, adoption of any such 
solution, impede the effort to revise SMTP to overcome 
the treats to the current e-mail system. Thus far, e-mail 
software vendors have not sought to fix the spam 
problem within SMTP; rather, their solutions treat the 
protocol as given and use various other anti-spam 
procedures. 
3. DG Model of E-mail Internet Infrastructure 
The directed graph model of e-mail Internet 
infrastructure [6] as shown in figure 2 is based on the 
types of the communicating entities called e-mail nodes. 
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Figure 2: Directed Graph Model of E‐mail Internet Infrastructure [6] 
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In this, e-mail communication is modeled as a 
directed graph of V vertices and E edges. Each vertex 
corresponds to an e-mail node which is a software unit 
involved in e-mail delivery process and works on the 
TCP/IP application layer. Nodes working on the lower 
layers such as routers and bridges which represent 
options to send e-mail without using SMTP are not 
considered in this model as almost all e-mail 
communication uses SMTP directly or indirectly. The 
vertices are grouped into five sets Vset1 through Vset5 
depending on the component it belongs to from the 
distinct components namely Sender, Sending 
Organization, Receiving Organization, Recipient along 
the Internet. The nodes corresponding to each component 
are listed in table 1. 
 
Table 1: List of Nodes in Directed Graph Model 
Node Name Node Definition  
Vset1 (Sender Node Set) 
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗ Senders Mail Transfer Agent can only establish SMTP connections with ESPs incoming
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚
௜௡௖ , ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ, ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻ or ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖ . 
ܯܷܣ௦௘௡ௗ Senders Mail User Agent can establish SMTP
* connections with
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚
௜௡௖ , ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ, ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻, ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖  or an HTTP(S) connection with 
ܹܾ݁ܵ݁ݎݒ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚. 
ܱݐ݄݁ݎܣ݃݁݊ݐ௦௘௡ௗ Other agents can establish ܵܯܶܲ כ  i.e. the connection other than SMTP based with gateways when 
such connections are possible i.e. with ܩ ஺ܹ,ௌெ்௉ or ܩ ஺ܹ,஻. 
Vset2   (Sending Organization Node Set) 
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚
௜௡௖  Sending organizations incoming Mail Transfer Agent can establish SMTP connections with 
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚, ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ,  ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖ ,  or ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻. 
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚ Mail Transfer Agent sending organization can establish SMTP connections with ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖ , 
ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ, ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻, or otherܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚. 
ܹܾ݁ܵ݁ݎݒ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚ Sending Organizations Web Server can establish ESP internal protocol based connection with 
ܯܶܣ௦௘௡ௗை௥௚
௜௡௖ . 
 Vset3 (Internet Node Set) 
ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ SMTP Relay can establish SMTP connections with ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖ , ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻ or other SMTP Relay. 
ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻ Gateways making ܵܯܶܲ כ connections with ܩ ஺ܹ,ௌெ்௉ , or ܩ ஺ܹ,஻. 
ܩ ஺ܹ,ௌெ்௉ Gateways making SMTP connections with ܩ ௌܹெ்௉,஻ ܵܯܶܲ െ ܴ݈݁ܽݕ  or ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚௜௡௖ . 
ܩ ஺ܹ,஻ Gateways making ܵܯܶܲ כ connections with ܩ ஺ܹ,ௌெ்௉ or other ܩ ஺ܹ,஻ . 
Vset4 (Receiving Organization Node Set) 
ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚
௜௡௖  Receiving Organizations Mail Transfer Agent making SMTP connection with ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚ or ESP 
internal protocol based connection with ܯܦܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚. 
ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚ Receiving Organizations Mail Transfer Agent making SMTP connection with other  ܯܶܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚ or 
ESP specified internal connection with ܯܦܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚. 
ܯܦܣ௥௘௖ை௥௚ Receiving Organizations Mail Delivery Agent making ESP specified internal connection with 
ܯ݈ܽ݅ܵ݁ݎݒ௥௘௖ை௥௚. 
ܯ݈ܽ݅ܵ݁ݎݒ௥௘௖ை௥௚ Receiving Organizations Mail Server making mail access protocol MAP based connection with 
ܯܷܣ௥௘௖or ESP specified internal connection with ܹܾ݁ܵ݁ݎݒ௥௘௖ை௥௚. 
ܹܾ݁ܵ݁ݎݒ௥௘௖ை௥௚ Receiving Organizations Web Server making HTTP(S) based connection with  ܯܷܣ௥௘௖. 
 Vset5 (Recipient Node Set) 
ܯܷܣ௥௘௖ Recipients Mail User Agent does not make any outgoing connection considering forwarding of 
email to be treated as a new sequence. 
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All MUA nodes are simply software packages that 
normally allow end users to compose, create or read e-
mail. They may be used to send e-mail to the receiving 
MUA directly or indirectly. MTAs are in effect postal 
sorting agents that have the responsibility of retrieving 
the relevant mail exchange (MX) record from the 
Domain name Servers (DNS) [7] for each e-mail to be 
send thus mapping the distinct e-mail addressee’s domain 
name with the relevant IP address information. They may 
also be used to compose and create e-mail messages. 
Node named OtherAgents are software packages that 
send e-mail message through gateways. WebServ nodes 
are the e-mail servers that provide the Web environment 
for composing or sending or reading an e-mail message. 
SMTP-Relays [8] are the nodes that perform e-mail 
relaying. Relaying is the process of receiving e-mail 
message from one SMTP e-mail node and forward it to 
another one. This scenario takes care of the mailbox 
exchange forwarding rule and indirect mail delivery 
using Local Mail Transfer Protocol (LMTP) (RFC 2033). 
Gateway nodes are used to convert e-mail messages from 
one application layer protocol to other. Gateway nodes 
named GWSMTP,B accept SMTP e-mails and transfer it 
with a protocol other that SMTP and GWA,SMTP performs 
the inverse process at incoming and outgoing interfaces. 
Gateway nodes GWA,B do not use SMTP either for 
incoming or outgoing interfaces. A process called Proxy 
may be done at these nodes when incoming and outgoing 
interfaces use same protocols. 
Each edge of the graph connecting two e-mail nodes 
represents possible e-mail flow between them using a 
particular set of protocols. In table 2, we list the groups 
of protocols used in e-mail flow between two possible e-
mail nodes along with the protocols in each group and 
the edges using protocols from that group for flow of the 
e-mail. 
 
Table 2: Protocol Groups, Protocols in each group and edges using a particular protocol set  
Protocol Group Protocols in group Edges 
ܵܯܶܲ SMTP protocol (RFC 821), SMTP service extension protocols ESMTP including Service 
Extension for Authentication (RFC 2554), Delivery by SMTP Service Extension (RFC 
2852), SMTP Service Extension for Routing Enhanced error (RFC 2034) and SMTP 
Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security (RFC 3207). 
e1, e2, e3, e4, e13, 
e14, e15, e16, e17, 
e18, e19, e20, e21, 
e22, e23, e26, e27, 
e28, e31, and e34.
ܵܯܶܲכ All protocols in SMTP set and all SMTP extensions for e-mail submission from MUA to 
e-mail node with SMTP incoming interface. E-mail node can be MTA defined in RFC 
2821, MSA defined in RFC 2476. Using MSA various methods can be applied for 
ensuring authenticating user that include IP address restrictions, secure IP and POP 
authentication. 
e5, e6, e7 and e9. 
ܵܯܶܲ כ All Internet application protocols except those specified in ܵܯܶܲכ group, all propraitory 
application protocols used on the Internet (also used for tunneling), all Internet protocols 
on the transport and network layers such as TCP/IP as it is quite possible to send e-mail 
without the use of application layer protocols. 
e10, e11, e24, e25, 
e29 and e30 . 
ܪܶܶܲሺܵሻ HTTP (RFC 2616), HTTP over SSL and HTTP over TLS (RFC 2818). e8 and e38. 
ܫܰܶ ESP specific Protocols and procedures for internal e-mail delivery. e12, e32, e33, e35 
and e36. 
ܯܣܲ All email access protocols used to transfer e-mails from the recipient e-mail server to 
MUA that include IMAP version 4 (RFC 1730) and POP version 3 (RFC 1939). 
e37. 
 
Using the discussed model different types of e-mail 
delivery including delivery of spam e-mail can be 
described in terms of a set of directed paths. The graph 
provides a framework for analyzing anti-spam measures 
and shows all possible spam delivery routes. 
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4. Mail Path Analysis 
Each option of sending a legitimate e-mail represents 
an option to send bulk e-mail as well as spam. The 
directed graph shown in figure 2 has 38 edges labeled e1 
through e38 representing a possible e-mail flow and 
connecting 16 e-mail nodes labeled A through P.  Two e-
mail nodes are connected by an edge if and only if the 
Internet e-mail architecture allows e-mail flow between 
the corresponding node types. As can be noted from the 
graph, the edges e17, e23, e30 and e34 at e-mail nodes F, G, 
J and L respectively designate loops in the graph. A loop 
at node F indicates a possible chain of more than one 
Mail Transfer Agents. The loop at node G designates a 
possible use of more than one SMTP Relay. A possibility 
of the use of more than one Gateway converting one 
protocol based e-mail to another is indicated by a loop at 
node J. The use of multiple Mail Transfer Agents at 
receiving organization is mentioned by a loop at L. Table 
3 provides an approximation of various paths from an e-
mail node to the target node i.e. node P. 
Table 3: Paths from any node to P 
Node Adjacent Nodes Possible Paths 
A K, G, D, H AK..., Aܩҧ…, AD…, AH… 
B K, D, G, E, H BK…, BD…, Bܩҧ…, BE…, BH… 
C I, J CI…, Cܬ ҧ… 
D K, F, G, H DK…, Dܨത…, Dܩҧ…, DH…. 
E D ED…, 
F F, K, G, H ܨതK…, ܨതܩҧ…, ܨതH… 
G G, K, H ܩҧK…, ܩҧH… 
H I, J HI…, Hܬ ҧ… 
I K, H, G IK…, IH…, Iܩҧ… 
J J, I ܬ ҧI… 
K L, M Kܮത…, KM… 
L L, M ܮതM… 
M M, N MN… 
N P, O NP, NO… 
O P OP 
P None None 
Note: Dots in paths represent all paths from the last node 
mentioned in the path e.g. MN… means the paths MN, MNP 
and MNOP. Also a bar on a node label represents a possible 
loop e.g. ܩҧ  means one or more gateways in the path. 
 
From table 3, it is evident that the arrangement of nodes 
and edges of graph shown in figure 2 makes numerous 
paths for e-mail transaction. The paths include both direct 
and indirect paths. Direct paths make a connection 
between a sending node and a receiving node through an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) (not shown in the graph) 
which merely forwards the TCP packets. Indirect paths 
establish connections between a sending node and a 
receiving node through intermediate nodes like nodes of 
the (E-mail Service Provider) ESP and/or Internet E-mail 
Service Nodes (IESN). 
5. Mail Classification 
A complete e-mail transaction is one that originates 
from any one of the possible starting node {A, B, C, D, 
F} and terminates by delivering e-mail to any one of the 
possible receiving node {K, L. N}. An e-mail send to the 
first MTA (node K) can be considered as delivered and 
thus we can safely consider delivery up to node K for 
further analysis. Out of the five participating components 
i.e. Sender, Sending Organization also called E-mail 
Service Provider (ESP), Internet E-mail Service Nodes 
(IESN), Receiving Organization and the Recipient, last 
two do not affect the delivery process.   Hence e-mail 
classification can be made on the basis of participation of 
different types of nodes belonging to first three 
components i.e. Senders Nodes, ESPs Nodes and IESNs 
nodes. This classification is shown in table 4.  
This classification shows that their exist as many as  
14 unique ways of sending e-mail or spam which differ 
from one another in terms of the paths followed, 
protocols used and the types of the e-mail nodes used. 
Security system violations of ESPs caused by various 
infections like viruses, Trojan horses, worms, etc. would 
create more ways to send spam. 
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Table 4: Mail Classification 
S. 
No. 
Participating Node(s) Originating
Node(s) 
Protocol 
Group(s) 
Path(s) 
1. MTA of ESP D or F SMTP DK, DܨതK, ܨതK 
2. MTA of ESP then Relay(s) D or F SMTP DܨതܩҧK, DܩҧK, ܨതܩҧK 
3. MTA of ESP then Relay(s) & 
Gateway(s) 
D or F SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ DܨതܩҧH…K,  DܩҧH…K,  DܨതH…ܩҧK,  DH…ܩҧK, 
ܨതܩҧH…K, ܨതH…ܩҧK  
4. MTA of ESP then Gateway(s) D or F SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ DܨതH…IK, DH…IK, ܨതH…IK 
5. Senders MTA or MUA A or B SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ AK, BK 
6. Senders MTA or MUA then 
Relay(s) 
A or B SMTP AܩҧK, BܩҧK 
7. Senders MTA or MUA then 
Gateway(S) 
A or B SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ AH…IK, BH…IK 
8. Senders MTA or MUA then 
Relay(s) & Gateway(S) 
A or B SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ AܩҧH…K, BܩҧH…K, AH…ܩҧK, BH…ܩҧK 
9. Other Agents then Gateway(s) C SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ CI…IK, Cܬ ҧI…IK, CIK, Cܬ ҧIK 
10. Other Agents then Gateway(s) and 
Relay(s) 
C SMTP, ܵܯܶܲ כ CI…ܩҧK, Cܬ ҧI…ܩҧK, CI…ܩҧ…IK, Cܬ ҧI…ܩҧ…IK 
11. Senders MTA or MUA & then 
MTA(s) of ESP or Web Server of 
ESP 
A or B SMTP, SMTP*, 
HTTP(S), INT 
ADܨതK, ADK, BDܨതܭ, ܤܦܭ,   
BEDܨതK, BEDK 
12. Senders MTA or MUA & then 
MTA(s) of ESP or Web Server of 
ESP then Relay(s) 
A or B SMTP, SMTP*, 
HTTP(S), INT 
ADܨതܩҧK,  ADܩҧK,  BDܨതܩҧK,  BDܩҧK,  BEDܨതܩҧK, 
BEDܩҧK 
13. Senders MTA or MUA & then 
MTA(s) of ESP or Web Server of 
ESP then Gateway(s) 
A or B SMTP, SMTP*, 
HTTP(S), INT 
ADܨതH…IK, ADH…IK, BDܨതH…IK, BDH…IK, 
BEDܨതH…IK, BEDH…IK 
14. Senders MTA or MUA & then 
MTA(s) of ESP or Web Server of 
ESP then Relay(s) & Gateway(s) 
A or B SMTP, SMTP*, 
HTTP(S), INT 
ADܨതܩҧ…I…K, ADܩҧ…I…K, ADܨതH…ܩҧ…K, 
ADH…ܩҧ…K, BDܨതܩҧ…I…K, BDܩҧ…I…K, 
BDܨതH…ܩҧ…K, BDH…ܩҧ…K, BEDܨതܩҧ…I…K, 
BEDܩҧ…I…K, BEDܨതH…ܩҧ…K, BEDH…ܩҧ…K 
 
6. Spamming Modes 
The mail classification shown in table 4 can be used 
to deduce modes for spamming by grouping those entries 
which use nodes that belong to the same participating 
component i.e. Sender, ESP or IESN. Thus obtained 
spamming modes are presented in table 5. 
Table 5: Spamming Modes 
Mode Participation Protocols Exploited 
1. ESP SMTP 
2. ESP & IESN SMTP and ܵܯܶܲ כ 
3. Sender ܵܯܶܲ כ  
4. Sender & IESN SMTP and ܵܯܶܲ כ 
5. Sender & ESP SMTP, HTTP(S), INT, 
and SMTP* 
6. Sender, ESP and IESN SMTP, HTTP(S), INT, 
and SMTP* 
Spamming done using modes 1 or 2 represent ESPs 
being involved in spamming either directly or indirectly 
owing to some security violations due to viruses or 
worms. Option 3 represent spamming directly to MTAs 
of receiving organization without use of ESPs or IESN 
using Internet service providers (ISP) that in this case 
simply forward TCP packets of the sender on either port 
25 or 587. The spamming option 4 represents spamming 
using indirect means by making use of one or more types 
of IESN. Spammers in this option are not restricted to 
port 25 and 587 only. In Option 5, spammers use ESPs 
services for sending spam. Option 6 represents spammers 
exploiting ESPs by using ESPs to forward spam to 
intermediate nodes i.e. IESNs. This option of spamming 
is unlikely to occur without the use of support of the 
ESPs.  
Besides the spamming modes identified in table 5; 
infected ESPs on sender or receiving side make other 
spamming modes also possible. These include situations 
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in which spammer is sending the spam directly to internal 
MTA or MDA or Mail Server. A receiving ESP may 
itself send spam to the mailboxes on its Mail Server for 
its financial gain; however the chances for such a form of 
spamming is low. 
The possibility of detecting spam and filtering it can 
be performed at various places in the system. Depending 
on the spamming mode used for spamming different 
possibilities for its detection exist. These possibilities are 
outlined in table 6. 
Table 6: Possible detection places 
Place of 
Detection 
Spamming Modes 
I II III IV V VI 
Recipient ? ? ? ? ? ?
Receiving ESP ? ? ? ? ? ?
IESN ? ? ? ? ? ?
ISP ? ? ? ? ? ?
Sending ESP ? ? ? ? ? ?
A ? indicates the possibility of designing a spam 
detection technique and a ? marks no such possibility. 
Possibility of detecting spam at recipient and receiving 
ESP exist for all modes of spamming. However, 
detecting techniques working at these places are 
considered to be least efficient because they cannot save 
network recourses from being misused by spammers. 
Detecting schemes that are closes to the sender would 
prove to be more successful. 
7. Conclusion 
Spam originates from an illegitimate Sender or in some 
cases from ESPs for financial gains. There are numerous 
possible routes for its flow through the Internet that 
besides exploiting other protocols, mainly exploits the 
trust build into the SMTP protocol and its extensions. 
Spamming with some reasonable assumptions can be 
grouped in six distinct classes depending on the type of 
the participating components. Spam detection and 
filtering can be performed at various places in the 
system; however any detection measure that is close to 
the sender would prove to be a more successful 
prevention. Such a prevention measure requires a wide 
scale change in the existing SMTP based e-mail and its 
adoption by ESPs 
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